Science Reporting: Does Science Journalism exemplify Scientific Testimony?
George Barimah
23 November 2023
In this talk I provide a framework in which we can think about testimonial injustice committed against trustworthy scientific experts. I consider the concept of testimonial injustice in social epistemology and how that can be applied to scientific testimony. Since scientific experts are testifiers and we know that there are wrongs committed against testifiers, then it is possible that scientific testifiers can be wronged as well. In order to develop an account of testimonial injustice against experts, I build on the concepts of second-order assessments (Goldman, 2001; Anderson, 2011), epistemic trust (Irzik and Kurtulmus, 2019; Wilholt, 2013), recommendation trust (Bennett, 2022), wilful ignorance (Wieland, 2017) and wishful speaking (John, 2018). I also distinguish between ‘inculpable’ and culpable testimonial injustice committed against trustworthy scientific experts. I argue that those who commit ‘inculpable’ testimonial injustice wrongfully judge a trustworthy expert because of a lack of information and an inability to conduct second-order and value assessments due to inadequate training. Perpetrators of culpable testimonial injustice, on the other hand, do so wilfully, even though they have the ability to perform second-order and value assessments, due to the economic, social and political benefits they gain by discrediting scientific experts.
